War was narrowly averted through last-minute American mediation. The cease-fire broke down a year later, when Israel launched Peace for Galilee, an operation designed to drive the PLO and the Syrians from Lebanon and pave the way for a peace treaty with the Lebanese Christian leadership under the charismatic Bashir Gemayel.
The next day, Christian militiamen moved into the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila and butchered more than unarmed civilians.
Israel, which had allowed the militiamen into the camps to seek out Palestinian gunmen, was blamed for the massacre. Throughout the war, the world media had been highly critical of Israel and of its defense minister, Ariel Sharon, who was eventually forced to resign after an Israeli commission found him indirectly responsible for the killings. Still, Israel and the new Lebanese authorities were able to negotiate a peace deal in the spring of After the war, Syria moved troops back into Lebanon, and quickly regained its influence over the Beirut government.
Israel remained in occupation of a security zone in the South to protect its northern border. That led to an year-long war of attrition with the Hezbollah, in which hundreds of Israelis died. Two major Israeli air operations, Accountability in and Grapes of Wrath in , followed persistent Katyusha attacks on northern Israel, but had little long-term effect.
In May , Israel withdrew from Lebanon to the international border, in a move ratified by the United Nations. Hezbollah moved militiamen down to the border and, like the PLO before them, created a state-within-a-state in the South.
In September , the U. It is worth to underscore the conclusions that can be drawn at the end of the war between Israel and Lebanon, even if these are not new. There is no military solution to the conflicts in the Middle East. A solution for the devastating conflicts of this region can only be achieved through negotiations.
Those who wage on violence as a means to resolve controversies only contribute to create more violence and radicalization between the parties involved. All the current conflicts in the Middle East are interrelated.
It is impossible to solve any of them in an isolated manner, without taking account of the other conflicts. Therefore, the only feasible solution is a comprehensive solution. This interrelatedness should not lead to considering all conflicts equally or finding solutions that are comparable to all of them.
In particular, the Israel-Palestine is in at the heart of all crisis. It is a conflict resulting from the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. Let us not ignore that this is the greatest affront for the Arab world, one that is perceived as such by its population. As long as no progress is made in the peace process there is no possible solution for the rest of conflicts. The Palestinian question is at the heart of this problem, and our first efforts must be dedicated to it.
But a solution shall only possible if progress is made towards resolving the other conflicts in the region, particularly on the Syrian and Lebanese sides. A crisis in which the main actors of this zone appear internally weakened is one of the current problems, and peace is unlikely to be inspired by the region itself. Forces and trends in favour of peace can be found in the Middle East, but they need a boost from outside the Arab world. The US has shown little interest in promoting the Peace Process in recent years.
This may be explained by the fact that they have many fronts to attend in the region, for their perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict or for the importance they give to the Palestinian side. Nonetheless, it is fair to acknowledge that in recent months State Secretary Condoleezza Rice fostered a series of bilateral contacts between the Israeli Prime Minister and the Palestinian Presidency. Therefore, the only feasible solution is a comprehensive one. Even though the US is a relevant actor in the region, Europe is bound to play a decisive role in the Peace Process.
By being present on the ground, Europe is adopting for the first time an active role and assuming political responsibilities of the greatest importance. By sending several thousand troops from France, Italy, Spain, Germany and other European states, the European Union is obliged to take a relevant and active role in the region once and for all. The great challenge ahead is to form a united front, while inspiring a multilateralism leading to a common and autonomous policy.
If this is not pursued, the Middle East shall be most likely hit by the violence and devastation of war once again. IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook In recent years, Israel also has expressed concerns that the group is trying to import or develop an arsenal of precision-guided missiles. Israel has repeatedly threatened to attack Lebanese border villages where it accuses Hezbollah of hiding rockets. An Israeli security official said Friday the military was carrying out airstrikes unlike any in years and was planning for more options.
The official spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss military policy. The attack sparked tensions between locals and Hezbollah. Videos on social media after the rocket attack showed two vehicles, including a mobile rocket launcher, being stopped by residents of Shwaya village. The windshield of one vehicle was smashed. The Lebanese army said it arrested four people who were involved in the rocket-firing and confiscated the rocket launcher. In a broader sense, the war has jeopardized not only the long-term stability of Lebanon but has presented the Bush Administration with a basic dilemma.
On one hand, the Administration is sympathetic to Israeli military action against a terrorist organization; President Bush has spoken in favor of Israel's right of self-defense. On the other hand, the fighting dealt a setback to Administration efforts to support the rebuilding of democratic institutions in Lebanon.
One commentator suggested "the two major agendas of his [Bush's] presidency—anti-terrorism and the promotion of democracy—are in danger of colliding with each other in Lebanon. If Lebanon disintegrates through a return to communal civil strife or becomes closely aligned with Syria or Iran, U.
The United States would lose a promising example of a modernizing pluralist state moving toward a resumption of democratic life and economic reform and quite possibly face a return to the chaos that prevailed in Lebanon during the year civil war.
Such conditions would be likely to foster terrorism, unrest on Israel's border, and other forms of regional instability. Moreover, the growth of Syrian or Iranian influence or some combination of the two could strengthen regional voices supporting extremist and likely anti-Western views associated with clerical regimes Iran , totalitarian models Syria , or a militant stance toward Israel.
A viable cease-fire, on the other hand, could be an initial step toward further progress in the long quest for regional peace. With Hezbollah deeply ingrained in Lebanese Shiite society, the movement has become a fixture in the political system, though whether or not its militia and terrorist wings can be disarmed remains to be seen. Many Israelis remain deeply skeptical over international efforts to disarm Hezbollah, as the real work of preventing re-armament over land, sea, and air will take place behind the scenes in the months ahead.
Israeli sources are already reporting the renewal of Syrian and Iranian shipments to Hezbollah though such reports are difficult to confirm. A key aspect of Hezbollah's possible re-armament is the role of Syria. Many questions remain concerning Syria: the willingness of the United States and Israel to bring Syria into the diplomatic mix, Syria's influence over Hezbollah in a Lebanon free of Syria's military occupation, and what demands Syria may make in exchange for its possible cooperation.
Some observers suggest a variety of theoretical incentives that the West could provide Syria, including the end of its isolation by the United States and the removal of Syria from the State Department's terrorism list and the relaxation of economic sanctions; the tacit recognition of its influence in Lebanese politics; the ratification of the EU Association Agreement with Syria that provides it with certain trade benefits; diminished international pressure regarding the U.
Others believe that U. After the recent attack on the U. Finally, speculation over the winners and losers of the war will most likely be debated for some time. Israeli officials believe that their overwhelming response to Hezbollah's provocation caught it and Iran off-guard and that Israel's subsequent operations have eroded its opponents' deterrent capabilities along the Israeli-Lebanese borders. Nevertheless, there are many Israelis both in and out of the government who believe that the war was poorly managed, did not achieve its goals, or was simply ill-conceived.
Hezbollah claimed that by merely surviving, it gained a symbolic victory over the more powerful Israeli army and that it continued to threaten Israel with rocket attacks after weeks of Israeli attempts to destroy its arsenal. Iran may believe that it achieved an ideological victory against Israel, seeing the conflict as producing increased Arab and Muslim support for Lebanese Shiites and for overall Iranian opposition to Israel.
Analysts caution that increased Arab and Muslim support for Hezbollah may simply be a temporary phenomenon in response to solidarity with the Lebanese people and sympathy for Lebanese civilian casualties. Others see increasing domestic political pressure in moderate Arab states and elsewhere, such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and even Turkey to condemn Israel and hold the United States partially responsible for civilian casualties in Lebanon as a way to deal with popular anger and their own Islamists.
The following was originally the opening section of this report and has been included in the Appendix for use a resource on background to the July-August war. It will not be updated. Although Hezbollah's July 12, , kidnaping of two Israeli soldiers initiated the conflict in southern Lebanon, tensions in the region had grown since the Hamas electoral victory in Palestinian legislative elections in January Over the course of the next six months, Israeli-Palestinian relations deteriorated rapidly, culminating in renewed fighting in the Gaza Strip, only months after Israel withdrew entirely from the territory and evacuated its settlements.
Most observers assert that Hezbollah used the clashes between Hamas and Israel as a pretext and justification for its July 12 attack. The following sections provide background on how the region was transformed over six months from one of relative calm to full-scale war. In response, the Quartet i. The electoral victory of Hamas surprised many outside observers and created a series of policy challenges for the Bush Administration, which had supported the election process as part of its efforts to reform the Palestinian Authority and its broader Middle East democracy promotion agenda.
Israel and members of the Quartet took steps to limit the provision of non-humanitarian aid and financial resources to the Hamas-controlled Palestinian Authority based on Hamas leaders' refusal to accept the Quartet principles.
The loss of customs revenue and direct foreign aid created crippling budgetary shortfalls for the PA and significant derivative economic hardship for many Palestinian citizens. President Abbas referred to the steps as a "siege," and throughout April, May, and June , tensions over unpaid salaries and disagreements over command responsibilities flared between the Hamas-led government and armed security force personnel loyal to Fatah.
Palestinian leaders, including President Abbas, engaged in several efforts to end the intra-Palestinian violence and bring closure to open questions of official Palestinian support for the Quartet principles see discussion of the National Accord Document below.
However, before these efforts could bear fruit, fresh violence between Israel and Hamas erupted in the Gaza Strip and has escalated. In March , Hamas and 12 other Palestinian groups agreed to extend an informal truce or "calm" referred to in Arabic as a hudna with Israel for one year. Some call the agreement a cease-fire even though it was a unilateral Palestinian declaration to which Israel was not a party.
Palestine Islamic Jihad PIJ did not agree to the calm and was responsible for several suicide bombings within Israel in the period that followed.
Hamas, which had been responsible for many suicide bombings during the second intifadah Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation that had begun in September , refrained from such attacks after declaring the hudna. It did, however, continue to fire mortars and rockets against Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip before Israel's summer withdrawal from the region and into southern Israel after Israel's withdrawal. Israel usually responded with air and artillery strikes, but it also carried out what it terms targeted killings of terrorists.
On June 9, , a Palestinian family was killed on a Gaza beach. The Palestinians claimed that the victims had been struck by Israeli artillery fire, but Israel denied responsibility for the deaths.
Nonetheless, the incident provoked Hamas to call off its truce and intensify rocket fire into southern Israel. Also in June, Palestinian factions held an intense national dialogue in the West Bank and Gaza in which they ultimately agreed on a National Accord Document also known as the Prisoners' Document because Hamas and Fatah leaders imprisoned by Israel had collaborated on the first draft to reconcile their positions and goals.
Hamas leaders in Damascus, notably political bureau chief Khalid Mish'al, reportedly did not agree with the National Accord Document because it might be seen as suggesting that Hamas had moderated its views regarding Israel and the peace process. On June 25, members of the Hamas military wing Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades and two other groups attacked Israeli forces in Israel, just outside of Gaza, killing two Israeli soldiers, wounding four, and kidnaping one.
The perpetrators demanded the release of Palestinian women and minors from Israeli prisons. Some analysts suggest that Mish'al was behind the attack in order to assert his power over more "moderate" Hamas officials in the territories and to undermine the National Accord.
On June 27, after unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to secure the kidnapped soldier's release, Israeli forces began a major operation which Israel explained as an effort to rescue the soldier, to deter future Hamas attacks including rocket launches from Gaza into southern Israel, and to weaken, bring down, or change the conduct of the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority government.
Israeli officials claimed that Hamas had crossed a "red line" with the kidnaping and attack within pre Israel, but said that Israel did not intend to reoccupy Gaza. On June 28, Hamas officials in the Palestinian Authority allied themselves with the kidnappers by adopting their demands. Israeli officials responded by insisting on the unconditional release of the soldier. On June 29, Israel forces arrested 64 Palestinian Hamas cabinet ministers, parliamentarians, and other Hamas officials in the West Bank and Jerusalem in what the Foreign Ministry described the action as a "normal legal procedure" targeting suspected terrorists.
In early military operations, Israeli planes bombed offices of PA ministries headed by Hamas, weapons depots, training sites, and access roads; ground forces entered Gaza to locate tunnels and explosives near the border and targeted Hamas offices in the West Bank.
After Hamas militants fired an upgraded rocket at the Israeli port city of Ashkelon on July 4, the Israeli cabinet approved "prolonged" activities against Hamas; air and artillery strikes and ground incursions are still occurring.
Meanwhile, Palestinian militants continue to fire rockets into southern Israel. International mediators have tried to calm the recent upsurge in violence. The Egyptians have reportedly proposed a resolution in which Hamas would release the soldier in exchange for an Israeli promise to release prisoners at a later date. On July 10, however, Khalid Mish'al insisted on the mutual release or "swap" of prisoners. On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert reportedly said that trading prisoners with Hamas would cause a lot of damage to the future of the State of Israel, perhaps because it would continue a precedent that he seeks to break.
Abbas told a visiting U. Hamas leader Mish'al appears to be in control of key elements in Hamas and emphasizes the importance of cooperation between Hamas and Hezbollah and specifically calls for not separating the Palestinian and Lebanese issues.
On July 12, under cover of massive shelling of a town in northern Israel, Hezbollah forces crossed the international border from Lebanon into northwestern Israel and attacked two Israeli vehicles, killing three soldiers and kidnaping two. Hezbollah thereby opened a second front against Israel ostensibly in support of Hamas. Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's leader, suggested that the Hezbollah operation might provide a way out of the crisis in Gaza because Israel had negotiated with Hezbollah indirectly in the past even though it refuses to negotiate with Hamas now.
He said that the only way the soldiers would be returned would be through a prisoner exchange. Hamas's kidnaping of the Israeli soldier follows a different Hezbollah example. Moreover, two groups share the goal of driving Israel from occupied territories and ultimately eliminating it; both maintain close ties with Iran.
Nasrallah has publicly espoused an intention to kidnap Israelis to effectuate a prisoner exchange. Hezbollah, however, has the capacity to decide to act on its own and could have done so in the spirit of "Shi'a triumphalism" spurred by the Iraqi Shiites' ascension to power and Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. It also may have acted in solidarity with the besieged Palestinians or with its Syrian and Iranian supporters. Another explanation is that Hezbollah may have wanted to prevent a resolution of the Gaza crisis.
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas have claimed that an agreement for a prisoner exchange had almost been reached, immediately before the Hezbollah attack, but Hezbollah's action complicated or prevented it.
Some observers question Hezbollah's autonomy and offer other explanations for the July 12 action. Much speculation focuses on whether Hezbollah acted at the behest of or with the approval of Iran, its main sponsor, because Iran also supports Hamas or may have wanted to divert international attention from the impasse over its nuclear program.
If the latter is the case, it gained only a limited time when the U. Security Council postponed consideration of the nuclear issue due to the Lebanon situation because, on July 31, the Council approved a resolution demanding that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment program by August 31 or face sanctions. Others suggest that Syria may be using its Hezbollah allies to resurrect its influence in Lebanon, from which it had been forced to withdraw in Other experts give a more nuanced appraisal.
State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism Henry Crumpton reportedly asserted that Syria and Iran do not control Hezbollah, but added that Hezbollah asks Iranian permission if its actions have broader international implications. Israeli commandos destroy 13 passenger planes at the Beirut airport, in reprisal for attack by Palestinian terrorists trained in Lebanon on an Israeli airliner in Athens.
Israel invades south Lebanon and sets up a roughly km 6-mile occupation zone. Israeli agents detonate a car bomb in west Beirut, killing Ali Hassan Salameh, security chief of the Black September group. Salameh, known as Abu Hassan, was one of the plotters of the Munich Olympics attack against Israeli athletes in Terrorist and rocket attacks by Lebanon-based Palestinian groups and Israeli counter-strikes culminate in Israeli invasion of Lebanon.
Syrian army ousted from Beirut and thousands of Palestinian guerrillas under Yasser Arafat depart for Tunisia by sea. Israel captures Beirut after pro-Israel Christian leader Bashir Gemayel, who had been elected president, is assassinated. Hundreds of civilians in Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila are killed by Christian militiamen allied with Israel. Israel and Lebanon sign peace agreement under U.
Syria opposes it, and it is never ratified. Israel pulls back to a self-declared km 9-mile border security zone in south Lebanon controlled by Israeli forces and their Lebanese militia allies. Israeli helicopter gunships rocket car convoy in south Lebanon, killing Hezbollah leader Sheikh Abbas Musawi, his wife and six-year-old son. Hezbollah launches rocket attacks on northern Israel.
Israel unleashes "Operation Accountability," a week-long air, artillery and naval operation. After Hezbollah began shelling towns in northern Israel, Israel launched "Operation Grapes of Wrath," a day campaign against Hezbollah positions in south Lebanon. On April 18, Israeli artillery fire targeting Hezbollah rocket crews falls in and around a U.
The South Lebanon Army retreats from the Jezzine enclave north of the Israeli zone it held for 14 years. Israel ends year occupation of south Lebanon. On June 18, , the U. Security Council certifies Israel's withdrawal in accordance with U. Security Council Resolution Lebanon and Syrian governments maintain that withdrawal is not complete since it did not include the disputed Shib'a Farms enclave.
After a suicide bombing in Haifa killed 20 Israelis, Israel launches air strikes against an alleged terrorist training camp at Ain Saheb, northwest of Damascus, Syria. Security Council passed Resolution calling for withdrawal of "foreign forces" from Lebanon Syria and disarming of militia, such as Hezbollah. In response to the current crisis, Congress took swift steps to express its support of Israel and that country's "right to take appropriate action to deter aggression by terrorist groups and their state sponsors," and to urge "the President to continue fully supporting Israel as Israel exercises its right of self-defense in Lebanon and Gaza.
Others called for "the cessation of targeting A Senate resolution, S. Similar to S. Calls on Syria and Iran to end support to Hezbollah; international community to support lasting solution and reconstruction. In the early stages of U. Several Members of Congress objected to this, noting that the law is ambiguous at best, and called on the U.
Secretary of State to waive the statutory requirements for reimbursement. Congress adopted two measures increase funding available to the Social Security Administration to provide temporary assistance to U. Other legislation, as yet not enacted, proposed to change permanently the statutory basis under which the State Department requests reimbursements, or replenish funds in the budget of the Department of Health and Human Services that are expended once evacuees have returned to the United States.
Amends the State Department Basic Authorities Act of to remove the reimbursement requirement from permanent law. Authorizes the Secretary of State to cover the costs of evacuation related to the Israel-Hezbollah crisis without amending the underlying statute. Amends the Social Security Act to increase near-term funding for assistance to newly evacuated U.
Seeks to enact an amendment similar to that in H. Similar to H. Authorizes the Secretary of State to move funds from one account to another to cover the costs of evacuations.
Increases funding available to the State Department for evacuation expenses Wolf amendment. Expresses the House's appreciation to Cyprus and Turkey for the roles each played in sheltering evacuees. Syria, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah—the states and entities that Congress has noted for aggression against Israel, support for terrorism, or terrorist activities in the current crises—are currently subject to fairly comprehensive U.
The Secretary of State designated Syria and Iran as state sponsors of acts of international terrorism, in and respectively, thus triggering a myriad of statutorily required restrictions and prohibitions on aid, non-emergency agricultural aid, trade, support in the international banks, and other economic transactions.
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